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Abstract  
I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as 
equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of 
knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases 
of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by 
successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to 
what the Standard View predicts, are not modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding 
to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions 
of epistemic access and epistemic agency. 
 
1 Introduction: Ignorance as Lack of Knowledge 
There are definitional and axiological aspects of ignorance. Definitional are the aspects that explain what 
ignorance is, its nature. To offer a definitional account of ignorance is to say, for instance, what makes 
the sentence ‘S is ignorant that p’ true, independently of the content of p and of who S is. Axiological 
are the aspects of ignorance that contingently accompany the definitional aspects and that typically are 
the subject matter of social epistemology: what p’s content is, how S came to believe it, what S’s identity 
is, and how she maintains her belief. 
This paper is about the definitional aspects of ignorance, which are normally taken to be 
independent of the axiological ones. The mainstream approach in analytic epistemology of ignorance 
has it that an account of what makes ‘S is ignorant that p’ true need not capture all the connotations of 
the expressions ‘ignorance’ or ‘to be ignorant’. For instance, it is intuitively true that ignorance and its 
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cognates refer to some kind of epistemic deficiency or can be used in an epistemically derogative way 
(as in ‘flat-Earthers are ignorant’). Even though this and similar aspects of ignorance are important, 
analytic epistemologists don’t think that they determine what ignorance is.i  
In the definitional debate about ignorance, the standard account holds that being ignorant that 
p is equivalent to not knowing that p. That is, lack of knowledge is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for ignorance.ii  
Standard View of ignorance (SV): S is ignorant that p if and only if S lacks knowledge that p. 
The SV entails that ignorance and knowledge are contradictories: non-ignorance if and only if 
knowledge, and non-knowledge if and only if ignorance. A defender of SV, Pierre Le Morvan, puts it 
this way: under SV, ignorance and knowledge are ‘mutually exclusive and exhaustive’ (2011b, 335). 
Relatedly, and importantly, SV maintains that ignorance has no substantive or positive nature (cf. Le 
Morvan and Peels 2016, 17 and ff.). Although ‘knowledge’ is part of the analysans, SV doesn’t 
presuppose any account of knowledge nor any substantive epistemological claim. SV is taken to be an 
account of the nature of ignorance, not of the nature of knowledge: what the former is has no bearing 
on what the latter is, and vice versa. Although in this paper I aim to show that this is misguided, the 
proponent of SV believes that her view is not proved true or false by any substantive claim about 
knowledge. 
SV is orthodoxy in epistemology, and for good reason: it’s not only well-supported by linguistic 
intuitions (cf. Le Morvan and Peels 2016, 15-16), but it’s also philosophically plausible.iii To begin, 
parsimony seems to recommend SV. That is, if ignorance is an absence of knowledge, a theory of either 
of these —i.e. ignorance and knowledge— may ipso facto provide an explanation of the other. Also, SV 
promises us a unified account of ignorance and knowledge: in all cases in which we find one to be 
ignorant, we find one lacking knowledge. 
There’s a second orthodoxy of epistemological theorizing: knowledge excludes epistemic luck.iv 
Beliefs that are true due to veritic epistemic luck (such as lucky guesses, wishful thinking, as well as 
3 
 
beliefs formed in barn-façade and Gettier-type cases) don’t count as knowledge. These two orthodoxies 
of contemporary epistemology entail that lucky true beliefs, and even justified lucky true beliefs, are 
instances of ignorance. 
Accounts of ignorance aim to explain not only propositional or factive ignorance (that is, 
ignorance that or whether a proposition’s truth conditions), but also procedural (or how-to ignorance) and 
objectual ignorance (or ignorance of something). In this paper, I focus on factive ignorance.v Given that 
ignorance and knowledge are contradictories, there are at least four ways of being ignorant under SV:  
As belief is necessary for knowledge, there’s doxic ignorance when some proposition p is true and 
S doesn’t believe that p (i.e., S either disbelieves or suspends belief in p, or otherwise has never 
occurred to her to believe that p). 
As truth is necessary for knowledge, there’s alethic ignorance when p is true and S believes that 
not-p.  
Assuming that justification is necessary for knowledge, there’s justification ignorance when S truly 
but unjustifiably believes that p. 
Assuming that there’s an anti-luck necessary condition for knowledge, there’s luck ignorance 
when S truly and justifiably believes that p, but her so believing doesn’t meet an anti-luck 
condition (or whatever condition is needed to deal with Gettier and barn-façade cases). 
SV is very compelling.vi But, as I’ll argue in this paper by focusing on luck ignorance, it might be wrong. 
Indeed, by considering certain cases of epistemic luck —environmental luck— we are naturally led to 
the conclusion that an agent might lack knowledge and yet not be deemed ignorant. Though this 
sounds initially counterintuitive, I believe that such cases reveal serious shortcomings in our standard 
account of ignorance.  
Here’s the plan. In section 2, I present Duncan Pritchard’s distinction between intervening and 
environmental epistemic luck. The former occurs when an agent forms a belief that is true due to a 
coincidental intervention between her method of belief formation and the target fact. By contrast, in 
4 
 
cases of environmental epistemic luck, the agent forms a true belief that is free from this kind of 
coincidental intervention, and yet it is an easy possibility that her belief is false, given the epistemic 
environment she is in. In section 3, I argue that ignorance and knowledge differ in their modal profiles 
and that, although both kinds of epistemic luck are incompatible with knowledge, environmentally 
lucky true belief is not an instance of ignorance because it might be compatible with having epistemic 
access to the relevant fact. In section 4, I anticipate three possible lines of response to defend SV from 
the argument I present —I argue that they are either dialectically wanting or otherwise false in light of 
the distinction between environmental and intervening epistemic luck. I conclude in section 5 by 
suggesting an account of ignorance that is consistent with the main argument of this paper.    
Before I start, I should say that I don’t cause trouble to SV by proposing an alternative account 
of ignorance, nor does my argument indirectly supports competing accounts of ignorance on offer in 
the literature, such as the so called New View of ignorance for which ignorance is equivalent to lack of 
true belief.vii Indeed, the falsity of SV doesn’t entail the truth of any other account of ignorance. Given 
that SV credits itself of being uncontroversial, I challenge this by inspecting the matter under the light 
of relatively uncontroversial epistemological theses about luck, i.e., that veritic epistemic luck is 
incompatible with knowledge, that there’s distinction between environmental and intervening epistemic 
luck.  
 
2 Veritic Epistemic Luck: Environmental and Intervening 
Most epistemologists take it as uncontroversial that epistemic luck prevents a true belief, and even a 
justified true belief, from constituting knowledge.viii At least since Gettier’s classic paper (1963), 
epistemologists have been in the business of offering accounts of knowledge that avoid granting 
knowledge to agents whose beliefs are true as a matter of luck. The kind of luck that undermines 
knowledge has been called veritic epistemic luck (Engel 1992, Pritchard 2005, ch. 6). Many also agree that 
cases of veritic epistemic luck aren’t all of the same kind, i.e., luck may undermine knowledge in 
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different ways.ix   
What’s crucial to veritic epistemic luck is that an agent forms a belief that is true in a lucky way. 
One way this could happen is when S justifiably forms a belief that is true because, given an 
unbeknownst intervention, the target fact that makes the belief true ends up obtaining. Were there no 
lucky intervention, the agent would not form a true belief. This is the kind of luck exhibited in Gettier-
type cases; following Pritchard, I shall call this intervening epistemic luck (henceforth intervening luck).x. A 
toy example of intervening luck involves a shepherd who sees in the distance a sheep-shaped dog 
(Chisholm, 1977).  On the basis of her perception, she forms the belief that there is a sheep. But the 
sheep-shape she perceives isn’t actually a sheep. However, the agent’s circumstances are such that, 
unbeknownst to her, there is a sheep standing right behind the dog, so the belief ends up being true, yet 
luckily so. 
According to a second kind of knowledge-undermining luck, S’s justified true belief is lucky 
when her method of belief formation, relative to the environment she is in, could have easily led her to 
not form a true belief. Unlike the previous kind of epistemic luck, nothing intervenes between the 
belief, the conditions in which it is formed, and the target fact, since the agent forms the belief on the 
basis of evidence that is connected to the target fact that makes the belief true. The luck lies rather in the 
connection, which is lucky because of the unnoticed easy possibility of there not being a connection 
between the evidence and the target fact. Pritchard calls this environmental epistemic luck (henceforth, 
environmental luck). A toy example of environmental luck is the barn-façade case (cf. Goldman 1976): 
a tourist driving around barn-façade county sees what seems to be a barn and forms the belief that 
there is a barn. It turns out, however, that in barn-façade county most things that look like barns are 
(fake) barn-façades; however, she happens to see the only real barn in the county. So, her belief is true; 
but it’s true by luck, given that it could have easily been the case that the tourist, being in front of a 
fake-barn, forms the belief that there is a barn.   
Being species of veritic epistemic luck, both intervening and environmental luck are 
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incompatible with knowledge. The reason is that in order to count as knowledge, a belief not only 
needs to be true, but also be formed in such a way that it would be true in relevantly different but 
related counterfactual circumstances.xi Furthermore, we see the sense in which knowledge (or its 
necessary conditions)xii is modal: to assess whether S has knowledge, we not only assess what S believes 
and what obtains in the actual world, but also in nearby possible worlds. I shall come back to this issue 
in the next section, but it suffices to say at the moment that S’s true beliefs count as knowledge when 
neither S’s epistemic environment, nor S’s method and evidence for forming beliefs, could have led her 
to easily form false beliefs. Now, both intervening and environmental luck illustrate the situation of 
agents who form beliefs that could have easily been false, either because the belief would be normally 
false, or the belief is formed in an epistemically unfriendly environment.xiii  
A key difference between intervening and environmental luck is the role played by what I call 
epistemic access to the target fact, which refers to the explanation of why an agent forms a true belief. 
When believing that p, S has epistemic access to the fact that p (henceforth, epistemic access to p) iff: 
Truth condition: p is true;  
Epistemic agency condition: that S has the belief that p is explained by S’s exercise of her epistemic 
agency (which includes her cognitive faculties, abilities, or capacities); and 
Truth ⊕ epistemic agency condition: that S forms the true belief that p is explained by S’s exercise of 
her epistemic agency. 
How do these conditions relate to each other? If you have a false belief, or if you suspend judgement, 
you don’t have epistemic access to the relevant fact. That’s what Truth condition captures. But having a 
true belief isn’t sufficient to have epistemic access to the target fact you believe. For, as I am 
understanding it, epistemic access refers also to the way in which one forms a true belief. The 
Epistemic agency condition says then that one has epistemic access to a fact only if one forms the 
target belief because, and insofar, one exercises one’s epistemic agency, which here is understood 
broadly: one’s perception, one’s memory, one’s capacity to receive knowledge through testimony, one’s 
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reasoning abilities, etc. This condition is meant to capture this idea: you cannot have epistemic access to 
p if someone brainwashed you into believing that p or if having a concussion makes you believe that p. 
But the first two conditions aren’t sufficient to have epistemic access, because not only your belief has 
to be true and formed because you exercise your epistemic agency. The fact that you ended up forming 
a true belief should also be explained by the fact that you exercised your epistemic agency. It is here 
where the distinction between intervening and environmental luck is important. 
Environmentally lucky true beliefs are compatible with having epistemic access because they 
meet the three conditions above. In the case of the tourist, it is true that there’s a barn, she forms this 
belief by exercising her perceptual abilities, and the fact that she forms this true belief is explained by 
the fact that she did so.xiv In contrast, intervening lucky true beliefs aren’t compatible with epistemic 
access, since what explains the fact that the agent ends up holding a true belief is the lucky intervention 
(as opposed to the fact that she exercised her epistemic agency). It is true that the shepherd exercised 
her epistemic agency when forming her belief; in that respect the shepherd meets not only the Truth 
condition, but also the Epistemic agency condition. But having epistemic access to a fact also requires 
that one’s epistemic agency explains why the beliefs one forms are true. That the shepherd looked at a 
sheep-shaped dog (and formed the relevant belief on that basis) doesn’t explain the fact that she 
formed a true belief. The latter is explained by the fact that there happened to be a sheep nearby. This 
is why exercising one’s epistemic agency in forming a true belief by way of a coincidental intervention is 
not sufficient to have epistemic access to a fact. Even though both environmentally lucky true beliefs 
and intervening lucky true beliefs fall short of knowledge, the former are compatible with having 
epistemic access to the facts. 
This difference between environmental and intervening luck is crucial because in the next 
section I will argue that an agent doesn’t count as ignorant that p insofar as she retains epistemic access 
to p, even if she fails to know that p. This presupposes a distinction between epistemic access and 
knowledge, which might seem unmotivated. For, after all, why does the tourist have epistemic access to 
the target fact and yet lack knowledge? As I understand the notion, epistemic access to p might be 
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necessary, but certainly insufficient for knowledge that p; and a true belief that p is necessary, but 
insufficient, for epistemic access to p. In this sense, the notion is similar to that of cognitive achievement 
which some epistemologists discuss in connection with knowledge.xv Like the cognitive achievement / 
knowledge distinction, the epistemic access / knowledge distinction is meant to capture this idea: there 
are different ways of lacking knowledge and in some of them the not-knowledgeable subjects, in virtue 
of their exercise of their epistemic agency, are better off than their epistemic counterparts who lack 
epistemic. In this way, the epistemic access / knowledge distinction is meant to accommodate two 
different intuitions: that environmental luck is incompatible with knowledge (we are not willing to grant 
knowledge to the tourist) and that not all agents who lack knowledge and exercise their epistemic 
agency are on an equal epistemic footing. Agents who form environmentally lucky true beliefs are 
better off than agents who form intervening lucky true beliefs, or who guess or wishfully form true 
beliefs, in that their exercise of their epistemic agency is explanatorily relevant to their forming true 
beliefs. Their environment might preclude them from knowing, even if there is no fault, epistemically 
speaking, on their part.  
 
3 Epistemic Luck, Ignorance, and Modality 
The distinction between intervening and environmental luck might seem irrelevant to a discussion of 
SV and the nature of ignorance. If both kinds of epistemic luck are incompatible with knowledge, and 
if ignorance is lack of knowledge, then both intervening and environmental luck yield ignorance. End 
of story. 
Indeed, the idea that lucky true beliefs are not cases of ignorance isn’t a new issue for SV.xvi Rik 
Peels, for instance, has already contended that our intuitions regarding our ascriptions of ignorance to 
agents who form true beliefs due to veritic epistemic luck are at odds with SV: 
I enter my living room and look at the clock. The clock tells me that it is 3 p.m., so that I acquire the 
belief that it is 3 p.m. I know that the clock has always worked fine, but I have no idea that the clock 
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stopped working 24 hours ago. Would we say that in this Gettier-type case I am ignorant that it is 3 
p.m.? It seems implausible to say that I am. (Peels, 2011, 352) 
Confronting cases such as this, the proponent of SV argues that denying the existence of luck 
ignorance is based on a misunderstanding:  
While this [i.e. that Peels is ignorant that it is 3 p.m.] seems implausible to Peels, is it to the rest of us? In 
his imagined case, Peels has a belief that just happens to be true by sheer luck or accident and one based 
on the false belief that his clock is presently indicating the correct time. On the Standard View, Peels is 
ignorant in this case of the fact that it is 3 despite his having this true belief. Now, of course, in having 
the belief that it is 3 p.m., Peels is not ignorant of something. But what that something is can be 
explained on the Standard View as the proposition that it is 3 p.m. (else he could not presumably have the 
belief that it is 3 p.m.), and this is a different matter from his not being ignorant of the fact that it is 3 
p.m. (where not being ignorant of this fact amounts to not being ignorant that the state of affairs of it 
being 3 p.m. obtains). (Le Morvan, 2012, 388) 
Le Morvan argues that a confusion between ignorance of facts and ignorance of propositions gives raise to 
the intuition that there’s no luck ignorance involved in the case. Roughly, when S’s belief that it’s 3 p.m. 
is luckily true, S is not ignorant of the proposition that is expressed by the sentence ‘it’s 3 p.m.’, i.e., S is 
in a position to entertain and understand this proposition’s truth conditions. However, even though S 
isn’t ignorant of the proposition, S is still ignorant of the fact that the proposition expressed by the 
sentence ‘it’s 3 p.m.’ is true, i.e., she is ignorant that the truth conditions of this proposition obtain. But 
ignorance of propositions doesn’t determine the nature of factive ignorance, for what is in question is 
whether the agent fails to grasp that a proposition’s truth conditions obtain.xvii Thus, Le Morvan insists, 
insofar as an agent who forms a lucky true belief doesn’t know that the truth conditions of the 
proposition she believes obtain, she lacks knowledge and hence is ignorant. 
Given the dialectic above, exploiting certain cases of epistemic luck to leverage against SV 
seems like a dead-end. Notice, however, that in the debate no attention was paid to the different ways 
in which luck undermines knowledge. If we distinguish between environmental and intervening luck, 
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it’s possible to push forward the debate about the definitional aspects of ignorance while going beyond 
a mere clash of intuitions, or so I shall argue.   
Consider, first, that the defender of SV says that it’s impossible for S to avoid being ignorant 
that a proposition’s truth conditions obtain unless S knows that they obtain. But this claim seems to 
assume that all cases of epistemic luck are cases of intervening luck, that is, cases in which an agent has 
no epistemic access to the fact that makes her belief true.xviii Le Morvan’s version of SV deals with cases 
of epistemic luck by saying that agents who form lucky true beliefs merely entertain a proposition and 
thus fail to grasp that the proposition’s truth conditions obtain.  Now, although I concede that this 
might happen in cases of intervening luck (the shepherd entertains a proposition whose truth 
conditions don’t match what she’s actually seeing, i.e., a dog,), it is not true of cases of environmental 
luck. The tourist not only entertains the proposition that there is a barn; she was, as the case is 
described, presented with the truth-maker of the target proposition. Given that she forms the belief 
that there is a barn because she’s actually seeing a barn, she also grasps that the truth conditions of the 
target proposition obtain. Once we see that all epistemic lucky true beliefs are not created equal, and 
that some of them are compatible with having epistemic access to the facts, we have a prima facie reason 
to think that ignorance isn’t lack of knowledge, since one can lack knowledge without thereby failing to 
grasp that one’s believed proposition’s truth conditions obtain. 
Start by observing a difference between ignorance and knowledge. Knowledge is a modal 
notion. As suggested before, the idea behind the claim that luck is incompatible with knowledge is that 
the concept of knowledge is defined over entities in both the actual world and relevant possible worlds. 
One cannot determine whether a belief constitutes knowledge by simply examining the facts that obtain 
in actuality. Knowledge, that is, ranges over two different axes, i.e., over what an agent believes in the 
actual world and what she believes in nearby possible worlds. This is why a belief constitutes knowledge 
not only if it’s true in the actual world, but also in nearby possible worlds in which the subject forms 
the belief given the same evidence and the same method of belief formation.  
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I take it that SV is committed to the claim that ignorance and non-ignorance are modal 
notions. More particularly, SV treats ignorance and non-ignorance as modal notions when it comes to 
Gettier and barn-façade cases, in which a justified true belief isn’t sufficient to avoid being ignorant. 
That’s why SV predicts the existence of luck ignorance. Given that, under SV, ignorance and 
knowledge are contradictories (again: ignorance iff non-knowledge, and knowledge iff non-ignorance), 
it is committed to the following claim, which is just a corollary of SV: 
Modality of ignorance: for any given proposition p, S is ignorant that p unless S’s believing that p 
meets the modal condition necessary for knowledge.  
According to Modality of ignorance, one’s state of ignorance can be determined by modal facts, in that 
even if one’s belief that p is true in actuality, one still count as ignorant that p’s truth conditions obtain 
provided that the belief is false in relevant and nearby possible worlds. Its commitment to Modality of 
ignorance leads SV to say that both the tourist and the shepherd are ignorant that there is a barn and 
that there is a sheep, respectively; their beliefs, even if true, don’t meet the modal condition necessary 
for knowledge.   
However, there are grounds to believe that Modality of ignorance is false and that ignorance 
and non-ignorance aren’t modal in the same way that knowledge is. Ignorance is the kind of concept 
that is evaluated along one axis; it ranges over the (lack of) beliefs and what obtains in the actual world. 
Remember that, in the epistemological debate, a necessary condition of factive ignorance is that it’s a 
doxastic attitude (or a lack thereof) that fails to represent what is the case, where such a failure consists 
in failing to grasp that a proposition’s truth conditions obtain or are satisfied. Now, if in order to 
determine whether an agent’s doxastic state exhibits such a failure it’s sufficient to assess their beliefs 
and the facts that obtain in the actual world, it follows that ignorance is non-modal. In order to 
determine whether an agent is ignorant or non-ignorant that p, it’s irrelevant whether her belief that p 
meets or fails to meet the modal condition necessary for knowledge. That is, to determine whether S is 
ignorant that p we don’t need to evaluate whether: 
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(a) S believes that p across a relevant set of possible worlds; or 
(b) S falsely believes that p across a relevant set of possible worlds. 
On the contrary, ascriptions of ignorance are warranted by assessing the agent’s beliefs and the facts 
that obtain in the actual world. Given that ignorance is understood as factive ignorance, in order to 
determine whether an agent’s doxastic attitude fails to represent what is the case (i.e., fails to grasp a 
proposition’s truth conditions), it suffices with evaluating the agent’s beliefs and what obtains in the 
actual world. 
To see an example, suppose that the tourist is now in all-real-barns-but-one county. This 
county is populated with many real barns and there’s only one fake barn. Again, the tourist doesn’t 
know this particularity of her environment and happens to see a barn-façade at a distant field. The 
tourist forms the belief that there is a barn in the field but, unluckily, she’s looking at the only fake barn 
in the county. However, in most nearby possible worlds in which she looks at what seems to be a barn 
and forms the corresponding belief, her belief is true. Now, intuitively, given that the tourist’s belief is 
false, she’s alethic ignorant that there’s a barn. And we rightly ascribe ignorance to the tourist without 
taking into consideration that there are many close possible worlds in which she’s looking at a real barn 
and her belief is true. We can say that the tourist isn’t ignorant in those close possible worlds in which 
she forms a true belief that there is a barn, which then entails that in order to ascribe ignorance to an 
agent in the actual world we don’t necessarily take into consideration whether she is also ignorant in 
nearby possible worlds. Thus, ignorance, unlike knowledge, is a function of what an agent believes and 
what obtains in the actual world.  
Ignorance thus is non-modal because in order to fail to believe what is the case in the actual 
world, it’s not necessary that the agent’s doxastic state exhibits a failure to believe what is the case in 
counterfactual scenarios. The proponent of SV might respond that the previous case only shows that 
alethic ignorance is non-modal, which is obvious because there is nothing modal in not having a true 
belief. What the proponent of SV is committed to is that Modality of ignorance is true because, and 
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insofar as, to determine whether agents are not luck ignorant is necessary to take into consideration 
counterfactual scenarios. The argument against SV is thus incomplete, and I need to show that 
ignorance is non-modal in the additional sense that there are cases in which in order to be non-
ignorant, it’s not necessary that the agent’s doxastic state meets the modal condition necessary for 
knowledge. In particular, I need to show a case in which: 
(i) S forms a belief whose truth lacks modal robustness, i.e., it falls short of knowledge; and  
(ii) S forms a belief that doesn’t fail to represent what is the case in the actual world (in the 
sense that S grasps that the truth conditions of the proposition obtain), i.e., it’s an instance of 
non-ignorance.  
Environmental lucky true beliefs can meet these two conditions. In such cases, an agent’s true belief 
fails to meet the modal condition necessary for knowledge, and yet this doesn’t prevent the agent from 
grasping that the truth conditions of the proposition she believes obtain. The agent doesn’t fail to grasp 
that the target proposition’s truth conditions obtain because she has epistemic access to the target fact. 
For according to the account of epistemic access sketched above, the belief that p constitutes epistemic 
access because the fact that one successfully exercises one’s epistemic agency explains that one’s belief 
represents the world as it actually is. This is, in any case, true of the tourist: that she forms a true belief 
that there is a barn is explained by the fact that she exercised her perceptual abilities when being in 
front of the barn. One is not merely entertaining the proposition that there is barn when one believes 
that there is a barn after being in front of the truth-maker. That is, an agent who forms an 
environmentally lucky true belief, in virtue of having epistemic access to the target fact, may not fail to 
grasp that the proposition’s truth conditions obtain in the actual world. Of course, in counterfactual scenarios 
the tourist’s belief might fail to represent what is the case (because, say, in those possible worlds she 
believes that there is a barn when being in front of a fake-barn). But this is part of the modal 
robustness that precludes her belief from constituting knowledge, which differs from ignorance in their 
modal profiles. Whatever the epistemic status of the tourist’s beliefs in those nearby possible worlds, it 
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is still true that in actuality she has epistemic access to the target fact. Ignorance and non-ignorance are 
then non-modal in the particular sense that, contrary to what SV predicts, one can escape the state of 
ignorance without meeting the modal condition necessary for knowledge and one’s failure to meet the 
modal condition necessary for knowledge is not sufficient to make one ignorant (provided that one, in 
virtue of having epistemic access to the target fact, doesn’t fail to grasp that the target proposition’s 
truth conditions obtain).  
 Now, it follows that environmental lucky true beliefs can fall short of knowledge without 
yielding ignorance, which in turn implies that lack of knowledge is not equivalent to ignorance. We 
have thus a clear case against SV: ignorance is not equivalent to lack of knowledge because one can lack 
knowledge and at the same time lack ignorance. How so? By forming a belief that, despite falling short 
of knowledge, grants one epistemic access to the targe fact.  
Compare with intervening lucky true beliefs and notice that they don’t meet condition (ii) 
above. The shepherd who confuses a sheep-shaped dog with a sheep fails to grasp that the truth 
conditions of the proposition believed obtain given that she lacks epistemic access to this fact. On the 
one hand, the shepherd entertains a proposition whose truth conditions don’t match what she’s seeing 
in her actual circumstances —the proposition that is the content of the shepherd’s belief is different 
from the fact she was presented with. On the other hand, and as mentioned before, even though the 
shepherd forms the belief by exercising her epistemic agency, that she forms that truth belief isn’t 
explained by such exercise; her believing truly depends on the lucky intervention in the environment. 
It’s important to clarify that the argument presented doesn’t rely on, nor entails, that every true 
belief isn’t a case of ignorance. This would entail that the argument against SV gives indirect support to 
the New View of ignorance, which I also reject. The argument presented seeks to establish that only 
environmentally lucky true beliefs are compatible with non-ignorance, since they differ from other true 
beliefs that fall short of knowledge in that the agent’s epistemic agency explains why the relevant belief 
exhibits no failure in representing what is the case in the actual world, even if it’s false in nearby possible 
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worlds. What is wanting in environmentally lucky true beliefs is that the agent’s epistemic access to the 
target fact isn’t sufficient for knowledge, given that her belief’s being true is modally unstable. 
Alternatively, the problem with environmentally lucky true beliefs is the kind of epistemic environment 
in which they are formed, and not the way in which they are formed. The situation is different with 
other lucky true beliefs, such as lucky guesses, wishful thinking or intervening lucky true beliefs. They, 
according to the argument developed here, might still be cases of ignorance, since even if true, they fail 
to grant the subject epistemic access to the target fact.  
There’s another possible source of misunderstanding that I should set to one side. I’ve said 
that in cases of environmental luck one can lack both knowledge and ignorance that p and at the same 
time have epistemic access to p, where this access falls short of knowledge given the lack of modal 
robustness. A critic can say that this is misguided, given that the notion of epistemic access is itself 
modal. Specifically, the target notion states that a subject has epistemic access in her belief that p only if 
her believing truly is explained by her exercise of her cognitive abilities. And explanation and exercising 
an ability can be construed modally. The criticism would be then that I have misleadingly replaced one 
modal notion (knowledge) by another (epistemic access). However, even if explanation and abilities can 
be construed modally, I don’t think that makes ignorance or non-ignorance modal notions in the sense 
that SV does. Whether someone has epistemic access to p in actuality is a fact about the relationship 
between an agent and the world, given the way she forms her belief. This doesn’t require that her belief 
should be true in other possible worlds, even if the agent’s possession of her epistemic agency in 
actuality depends on her exercising it in counterfactual scenarios.xix 
Summing up, ignorance isn’t equivalent to lack of knowledge because one’s belief that p can be 
an instance of both non-knowledge and non-ignorance. Ignorance and knowledge, differing in their 
modal profiles, track two different aspects of our epistemic environment: whereas ignorance depends 
on what the agent believes and obtains in actuality, knowledge depends on the epistemic quality of the 
agent’s beliefs in counterfactual scenarios. But, as long as in cases of environmental luck the agent has 
epistemic access to the target fact in the actual world, we can say that she isn’t ignorant in the actual 
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world, even if she lacks knowledge both in the actual world and in nearby worlds.  
 
4 How may proponents of the Standard View resist this argument? 
I shall now propose and address three possible lines of response to the argument presented in the last 
section. Rather than being objections proper, these possible responses are features of SV that could 
possibly save it from the previous argument. One thing I hope to make clear is that each line of 
response comes with a price, i.e., making SV no longer a plausible account of ignorance, which is 
precisely part of its appeal.  
 
4.1 Ignorance has no nature hence the Standard View is irrefutable 
The first possible response is related to what SV is taken to entail. Under SV, ignorance is defined as 
lack of knowledge, irrespective of what knowledge is, since ignorance has no substantive or positive 
nature (Le Morvan and Peels 2016, 17). As already mentioned in the introduction, SV doesn’t 
presuppose any account of knowledge nor any substantive epistemological claim. It’s an account of the 
nature of ignorance, not of the nature of knowledge: what the former is has no bearing on what the 
latter is, and vice versa. Since under SV ignorance is the lack of whatever any account of knowledge 
takes knowledge to be, different accounts of knowledge will give different results about particular cases 
of ignorance. For instance, SV predicts that if there is lucky knowledge (cf. Hetherington 2001), then 
there’s no luck ignorance for that account of knowledge.xx The key point, and the one I’m addressing here, is 
that SV takes itself to be true independently of any substantial epistemological claim and thus it’s not 
proved true or false by a theory of knowledge (cf. Le Morvan and Peels 2016, 18 and ff.). Therefore, 
even if in cases of environmental luck S has epistemic access to the target fact, she is still ignorant, for 
the sole reason that ignorance is whatever an epistemological theory considers as a lack of knowledge.  
This line of response might seem appealing, but at this point of the dialectic is irrelevant. The 
idea that ignorance has no positive nature isn’t convincing to someone who thinks, following what has 
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been argued in the last section, that epistemic luck undermines knowledge in at least two different ways, 
and that one of them is compatible with there being access to the facts, which in turn doesn’t entail 
ignorance. That ignorance has no positive nature just is the way ignorance is conceived under SV. In 
other words, the possible line of response presupposes the truth of SV and makes explicit what it 
entails. However, if the validity and correctness of SV is at issue, the claim that ignorance cannot be 
refuted by an epistemological argument cannot be compelling to someone who denies that ignorance is 
just the complement of knowledge. Thus, we need a further reason to take seriously the idea that 
ignorance has no positive nature, and that reason must be independent of the assumption that SV is 
true. 
 
4.2 Lucky true beliefs lack access to the facts hence they are cases of ignorance 
The second possible response to save SV consists in making a substantive claim about the nature of 
ignorance to the effect that, given other relevant epistemological concepts, the best theory of ignorance 
is SV even in cases of environmental luck. In a different context, Le Morvan (2011a) has offered such a 
claim. When discussing cases of accidental and lucky true belief, he says: 
[In cases of epistemic luck], we have […] situations where (i) p is true, (ii) S believes that p, and yet (iii) S 
is ignorant that p. Why is S still ignorant that p despite S’s true belief that p? Because S’s true belief that p is 
merely accidentally true or true as a result of mere luck (2011a, 36). 
This passage is followed by a clarification: in cases of epistemic luck, ‘S did not know that p because S 
has no cognitive access to the state of affairs in virtue of which S’s belief that p is true’ (2011a, 36, fn.9). 
Given that ignorance is equivalent to not knowing, all cases of epistemic luck are instances of ignorance 
because S has no epistemic access to the facts that make her belief true.  
Can Le Morvan’s quoted words be used to save SV? Notice that they can be interpreted in at 
least two different ways. One possible reading is that S has no epistemic access to the facts in the sense 
that she doesn’t have reflective access to what could make her true belief knowledge. That’s to say, S has 
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a true belief but remains ignorant because she is unaware that her belief could have easily been false. 
This is true of both intervening and environmental luck: the agents are unaware of why their respective 
beliefs are true. On this reading, ignorance is lack of knowledge because even in cases of lucky true 
belief, S has no reflective access to the relevant facts that would turn her belief into knowledge. However, 
this claim is too strong. For one thing, it’s remarkably internalistic: only true beliefs formed in 
accordance with internalistic conditions would turn out to be knowledge –the rest would be plain 
ignorance. This is not only too demanding for most epistemic agents, but also favors epistemic 
internalism over epistemic externalism. It precludes SV from being a plausible and intuitive account of 
ignorance (at least for externalistic minded epistemologists).xxi  
A second, less strong reading of Le Morvan might be that even if S’s belief is true, she is 
ignorant because she has no epistemic access to the relevant facts that are the content of her true belief. 
But this is only the case when S has a belief that is true due to intervening luck. Thus, Le Morvan’s claim 
in favor of the SV, in the less strong reading, is false: not all cases of lack of knowledge, such as 
environmental luck, entail lack of epistemic access to the target fact. Thus, if ignorance isn’t entailed by 
environmental luck when the agent, though lacking knowledge, has epistemic access, then it isn’t 
equivalent to lack of knowledge. 
 
4.3 Ignorance is a modal notion too 
A different kind of response on behalf of SV could be that someone who has an environmentally 
lucky true belief is not ignorant.xxii If so, my argument has no force, because SV would now posit 
that (A) ignorance is equivalent to lack of knowledge and (B) environmentally lucky true beliefs 
can be instances of non-ignorance. However, I suspect that a defender of SV shouldn’t appeal to 
this line of reply. For (A) and (B) entail: 
(C) Environmentally lucky true beliefs can be instances of knowledge. 
If environmentally lucky true beliefs are (or can be) instances of non-ignorance, they are instances 
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of knowledge, because the latter is the contradictory of ignorance (under the Standard View). The 
problems now are, on the one hand, that (C) doesn’t follow from SV. The adherent to SV cannot 
just commit to (C) and save the day because SV is a view about the nature of ignorance and seeks 
to remain neutral about the nature of knowledge. (C) is, nonetheless, a claim about the nature of 
knowledge. Thus, a defense of (C) lies outside the resources available to an adherent to SV. On 
the other hand, most epistemologists think that (C) is false. So, defending SV by committing to 
(C) seems like a desperate solution. It’s ad hoc and unmotivated. It compromises the idea that SV 
should be uncontroversial.  
A further, related line of reply on behalf of SV is to defend that ignorance is modal by re-
telling the barn-façade story. Suppose that S drives around barn-façade county, sees a barn, and 
forms the belief that there is a barn. Even if S has epistemic access to the target fact in the actual 
world, the environmental luck that affects her belief entails that she would lack epistemic access 
in nearby possible worlds. Now, if S lacks epistemic access in nearby possible worlds, we might 
still think that she is ignorant, since what distinguishes her belief in the actual world from her 
belief in nearby possible worlds is the environmental luck involved. Alternatively: one’s true 
belief can amount to ignorance in virtue of the epistemic environment in which the belief is 
formed, provided that the environment makes salient the easy possibility of not having epistemic 
access to the target fact. So, environmentally lucky true beliefs are instances of ignorance, for the 
same reason that environmental luck precludes someone from having knowledge. 
I think that this is a reasonable way of defending SV. There’s a price though: to abandon 
the idea that ignorance has no positive nature and that a theory of ignorance doesn’t make 
substantial epistemological claims. For to say that S’s ignorance might depend on the epistemic 
quality of her beliefs given what obtains in other possible worlds is to add a modal component to the 
concept of ignorance. This is a substantive claim about the nature of ignorance, one that isn’t 
directly derived from the claim ‘ignorance is equivalent to lack of knowledge’.  
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However, this line of argumentation not only comes with a price; it’s also questionable. If 
ignorance is a lack of sorts, what does an agent or her doxastic state lack when she has a true 
belief that grants her epistemic access to the target fact? Remember that the reason she doesn’t 
possess knowledge is that she is in an epistemically unfriendly environment. Her doxastic state 
doesn’t lack anything that would have precluded it from being knowledge in a different (friendly) 
epistemic environment. This suggests that it’s not entirely obvious that the concept of ignorance 
maps our doxastic attitudes and epistemic environment both in the actual world and in nearby 
possible worlds. To be sure, the concept of ignorance maps the former: we ascribe ignorance to 
those who form (true) beliefs out of biases, wishful thinking, guesses, lucky accidents. But does 
the concept of ignorance map the epistemic environment? If we judge that environmentally lucky 
true beliefs are instances of ignorance, it’s because we are no longer taking into consideration the 
agent’s exercise of her epistemic agency, but the epistemic environment she is in. One may 
certainly think that our concept of ignorance maps the epistemic environment, if one already 
embraces SV. For imagine an epistemic subject who exercises a huge deal of virtuous epistemic 
agency and always forms true beliefs due to the high quality of their epistemic agency. Assume 
that this agent is epistemically unfortunate: her beliefs are true, yet fall short of knowledge due to 
recalcitrant environmental luck. SV forces us to say that she is ignorant of all the truths she 
believes, even if her failing to acquire knowledge is not up to her but to external factors 
pertaining to her epistemic environment. But we shouldn’t draw this conclusion, unless we are 
offered a reason to think that the concept of ignorance applies over and above the successful 
exercise of our epistemic agency when forming beliefs. 
 
5 Conclusion  
Let’s take stock. I questioned the standard conception of ignorance as lack of knowledge by arguing 
that environmental luck, despite entailing non-knowledge, is compatible with having epistemic access to 
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the target fact and hence with non-ignorance. I also argued that ignorance, unlike knowledge, isn’t 
modal and this gives us reason to think that an agent who has epistemic access to a fact, even if lacking 
knowledge of that fact, isn’t ignorant. The argument entails that ignorance and knowledge are not 
contradictories, as SV predicts, since one can lack both ignorance and knowledge (the argument thus 
entails that ignorance and knowledge can be contraries). 
I haven’t fully said what ignorance is, and yet the argument defended doesn’t depend on an 
alternative account. The argument has only suggested that non-ignorance should entail having 
epistemic access to the relevant fact. This claim, for the moment, gives us at least a necessary condition 
for non-ignorance:  
Factive non-ignorance: S is non-ignorant that p only if S has epistemic access to fact that p.  
Factive non-ignorance is neither an analysis, nor an account of, ignorance. Let me, however, conclude 
by suggesting how such an account might follow from the main argument of this paper.  
The basic idea of such an account is that ignorance isn’t defined by the lack of a particular 
doxastic state. Contrary to what SV and the New View of ignorance say, the nature of ignorance isn’t 
exhausted by either lack of knowledge or lack of true belief. Roughly, since one can be non-ignorant 
and at the same time lack knowledge (in environmental luck scenarios), ignorance isn’t equivalent to 
lack of knowledge. And since one can be ignorant while having a true belief (in intervening luck 
scenarios), ignorance isn’t equivalent to lack of true belief. Thus, we have:  
Denial of the SV: knowledge isn’t necessary for non-ignorance.  
Denial of the New View: true belief isn’t sufficient for non-ignorance.  
My suggestion is then that we can improve over SV and the New View by contending: 
Right to left: Lack of epistemic access to p is sufficient for ignorance that p, and 
Left to right: epistemic access to p is sufficient for non-ignorance that p. 




Access View of ignorance: For any true proposition p, S is ignorant that p if and only if S lacks 
epistemic access to p.   
It’s important to stress that this is a view of ignorance understood as a factive notion, that is, as 
ignorance of what is the case.xxiii Although this is not the place to attempt a defense of this view, two 
things are worth mentioning. On the one hand, the Access View is neither as permissive as the New 
View (which grants non-ignorance to anyone who has a true belief), nor as restrictive as SV (which 
deems ignorant those who, though lacking knowledge, have epistemic access to facts).  
On the other hand, the Access View promises to be a powerful account of ignorance.  
Remember the components of having epistemic access to a fact: truth plus the way the belief is formed 
(epistemic agency) plus the explanation of why the agent forms a true belief. Thus, epistemic access to a 
fact isn’t just a doxastic state. It is a very specific kind of epistemic state. According to the Access View, 
factive ignorance is better understood as a way of forming beliefs that prevents one from having 
epistemic access to the target fact. I take this as an interesting and potentially welcome result, since it in 
principle allows us to bring debates about the definitional and the axiological aspects of ignorance 
together. Social and feminist epistemologists think that ignorance isn’t reducible to an absence of truth 
or knowledge, and understand ignorance as a complex set of practices and dispositional states 
influenced by the social, political and epistemic context.xxiv In the quarters of analytic epistemology, in 
contrast, discussions about the definitional aspects of ignorance focus on distinguishing different types 
of ignorance and finding the doxastic/epistemic state (or its lack thereof) that is common to all types of 
ignorance. These epistemologists neglect the social epistemology’s approach, although they recognize 
that there might be complex social and political aspects that determine someone’s lack of knowledge or 
true belief (cf. El Kassar 2018, and Peels 2019). Although the differences in their respective explanatory 
frameworks don’t present the theorist of ignorance with a dilemma, it does pose the important question 
of what we can dispense with in an account of what, epistemologically, ignorance is. As the Access View 
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entails that an account of ignorance shouldn’t be oblivious to the way agents form their beliefs, it not 
only improves over SV, but is also relevant to discussions in social epistemology. Epistemic access to a 
fact, roughly understood as the quality and degree of one’s epistemic agency when forming beliefs, can 
be sensitive to one’s wider epistemic and social context. The optimal functioning of one’s cognitive 
abilities, and the success of one’s epistemic agency more generally, can depend on social and structural 
factors of one’s environment. Corrupting epistemic and social practices (from lying and suppression of 
information to social segregation and polarization) not only might prevent us from getting at the truth. 
They might also determine who is trustworthy, what evidence is available for what beliefs, and what 
means are employed to relate the available evidence to our beliefs; that is, they might affect the quality 
of our epistemic agency. As long as the undermining of agents’ epistemic agency can be useful to 
explain how ignorance is produced and maintained, the Access View nicely fits into the framework of 
social epistemology of ignorance.xxv  
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ignorance. 
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viii A notable exception is Hetherington (2001). 
ix Cf. Engel (2015), Hetherington (2011), Pritchard (2005, 2015), Turri (2013), Turri et al. (2015). 
x See Pritchard (2012, 2015); Pritchard et al. (2010). 
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xv Cf. Greco (2007, 2012); Pritchard (2012); Pritchard et al. (2010, ch.2); Sosa (2007, ch. 5). Whereas Greco and 
Sosa understand knowledge in terms of cognitive achievement, Pritchard thinks that they come apart in both 
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